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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FIRST AMENDMENT-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
-STATE AID TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLCHILDREN-The Supreme Court
of the United States has held that portions of an Ohio statute
authorizing the state to provide nonpublic school pupils with text-
books, standardized testing and scoring, speech, hearing, and psy-
chological diagnostic services, and therapeutic, guidance, and reme-
dial services are constitutional. Those portions authorizing state
expenditures for instructional materials and equipment and for field
trip transportation were held to be unconstitutional.
Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
In an attempt to provide state aid to nonpublic school students
in a manner conforming to the most recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Meek v. Pittenger,' the Ohio Legislature passed
section 3317.06 of the Ohio Revised Code authorizing state aid to
nonpublic school students for certain enumerated purposes.2 A
group of citizens and taxpayers of Ohio brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of all but one provision of the statute.3 A three
judge district court was convened, and it held the statute constitu-
tional in all respects.' The plaintiffs appealed, and the United
1. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). The suit involved a statute authorizing the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania to provide auxiliary services (Act 194) and textbooks acceptable for use in
public schools (Act 195) directly to students enrolled in nonpublic schools meeting Pennsyl-
vania's compulsory attendance requirements. Act of July 18, 1974, No. 170, § 1, 1974 Pa. Laws
477 (repealed 1975). Act 195 also permitted loans of instructional materials and equipment
directly to nonpublic schools. The auxiliary services included counseling, testing, psychologi-
cal services, speech and hearing therapy, and related services for exceptional, remedial, and
educationally disadvantaged students. The instructional materials and equipment included
periodicals, maps, charts, recordings, projectors, laboratory paraphernalia, and the like. The
United States Supreme Court held that Act 194 and all but the textbook loan provisions of
Act 195 violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. 421 U.S. at 373.
At the time Meek was decided, an appeal from a district court judgment holding a prede-
cessor Ohio statute providing for state aid to nonpublic schools was pending before the United
States Supreme Court. Wolman v. Essex, No. 73-292 (S.D. Ohio July 1, 1974). The case was
remanded for further consideration in light of Meek. 421 U.S. 982 (1975). On remand, the
district court entered a consent order dated November 17, 1975, declaring the predecessor
statute to be unconstitutional, but reserved the right to review the successor statute. It was
at this time that the appellants transferred their attention to the present legislation.
2. OHio Rxv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976).
3. The citizens group did not challenge authorization of aid for physician, nursing, dental,
and optometric services for nonpublic school students authorized in OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3317.06(E) (Page Supp. 1976). Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2602 (1977).
4. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D. Ohio 1976), rev'd in part sub nom. Wolman
v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977). The district court concluded that the effect of § 3317.06 was
to make available to all students in Ohio certain limited and inherently secular services and
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States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.'
Since nearly all nonpublic schools in Ohio are sectarian,' evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of the various forms of assistance author-
ized by section 3317.06 necessarily encompassed a consideration of
the establishment clause of the first amendment. The Supreme
Court began its analysis by referring to the three-part test which has
emerged in establishment clause cases, requiring that a statute have
a secular legislative purpose, have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and not foster excessive government
entanglement with religion.7 The Court perceived no difficulty with
the legislative purpose of the Ohio statute, finding that the statute
serves Ohio's legitimate interest in protecting the health of all its
youth and providing them with a "fertile" educational environ-
ment.8 The analytical difficulty arose in the "effect" and
"entanglement" criteria, and in applying those tests to the Ohio
statute the Court substantially relied on case law for guidance.
The Court found the textbook loan system set forth in section
3317.06(A)l to be strikingly similar to the systems approved in
materials. The court did not perceive the risk of excessive governmental entanglement to be
present because, although a large amount of aid was necessary to effectuate the authorized
program, there was no constitutional significance between "a little bit of secular aid and a
lot of secular aid." The potential for political division because of the program was seen to be
minimal because the statute provided services and materials to students attending nonpublic
schools only to the extent that such services and materials were also available to public
schoolchildren. Section 3317.06 was characterized as merely extending already existing pro-
grams to all students in Ohio. Id. at 1125.
5. Wolman v. Essex, 97 S. Ct. 730 (1977).
6. The parties stipulated that out of the 720 chartered nonpublic schools in Ohio during
the 1974-1975 school year, 691 were sectarian and more than 92% of the nonpublic enrollment
attended Catholic schools. It was further stipulated that the Catholic schools operate under
the general supervision of the bishop of their diocese, that most principals are members of a
religious order in the Catholic Church, that approximately one-third of the teachers are
members of a religious order, that a majority of teachers are probably members of the Catho-
lic faith, and that religious objects decorate the classrooms and hallways in these schools. The
school day consists of five hours of state-mandated instruction plus one-half hour of religious
instruction which non-Catholics are not required to attend. No teacher is required to teach
religious doctrine in his secular classes. 97 S. Ct. at 2598.
7. Id. at 2599. See notes 48-65 and accompanying text infra.
8. 97 S. Ct. at 2599.
9. OHno REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(A) (Page Supp. 1976) authorizes the expenditure of
funds
[tlo purchase such secular textbooks as have been approved by the superintendent
of public instruction for use in public schools in the state and to loan such textbooks
to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district or to their parents. Such loans
shall be based upon individual requests submitted by such nonpublic school pupils or
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Board of Education v. Allen'" and in Meek. Expressly declining to
overrule Allen and Meek, the Court concluded that this section was
constitutional.
The authorization of expenditures by the state for standardized
testing and scoring services for nonpublic school students found in
section 3317.06(J)" was held to be a permissible means to ensure
that the state's legitimate interest in seeing that all its schoolchild-
ren receive an adequate secular education was being served. 2 The
Court distinguished Levitt v. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty," in which a New York statute providing funding
for both teacher-prepared and standardized testing was invalidated,
emphasizing that the Ohio statute funds only standardized testing
not controlled by the nonpublic school. Thus, the use of the Ohio-
supported testing service as a part of religious teaching was pre-
vented, and the direct aid to religion found present in Levitt was
avoided.' Furthermore, the inability of the nonpublic school to con-
parents. Such requests shall be submitted to the local public school district in which
the nonpublic school is located. Such individual requests for the loan of textbooks
shall, for administrative convenience, be submitted by the nonpublic school pupil or
his parent to the nonpublic school which shall prepare and submit collective summa-
ries of the individual requests to the local public school district. As used in this section,
"textbook" means any book or book substitute which a pupil uses as a text or text
substitute in a particular class or program in the school he regularly attends.
10. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The United States Supreme Court upheld as constitutionally
valid a New York statute requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of
charge to all students in grade 7 through 12 enrolled in a public or private school which
complied with the compulsory education law. The textbooks loaned were those "designated
for use in any public elementary or secondary schools of the state or are approved by any
boards of education," and which a pupil "is required to use as a text for a semester or more
in a particular class" in his school. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 701 (McKinney 1969). The Court
asserted that religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education,
which are not so intertwined that secular textbooks furnished to religious schools are in fact
instrumental in teaching religion. 392 U.S. at 248.
11. OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(J) (Page Supp. 1976) authorizes the expenditure of
funds "[t]o supply for use by pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district such
standardized tests and scoring as are in use in the public schools of the state."
12. 97 S. Ct. at 2601. The Court declared that a state may require schools to meet certain
standards of instruction to fulfill compulsory education requirements and may examine both
teachers and pupils to ensure that the state's interest is being fulfilled. This section was
viewed as a means whereby the state may ensure that certain minimun standards are met.
13. 413 U.S. 472 (1973). State reimbursement of private schools for certain testing and
record-keeping costs mandated by the state was held to be unconstitutional aid to religion
because the aid to the secular function was not identifiable and severable from aid to the
sectarian. Failure to ensure that teacher-prepared tests did not inculcate religious precepts
was a fatal defect in the statute. See note 14 and accompanying text infra.
14. Because of the integral role that testing plays in the total teaching process, a means
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trol the test eliminated the need for government supervision that
might result in excessive entanglement.'5
Section 3317.06(D) and (F)'" also authorized expenditures to pro-
vide speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic services to pupils
in their nonpublic school facilities so long as such services were also
available to public school students within the district.'7 The danger
that providing such services on nonpublic school premises offered
"an impermissible opportunity for the instrusion of religious influ-
ence" was found by the Court to be insufficient to render that por-
tion of the statute unconstitutional.'" Impermissible church-state
entanglement was likewise found to be absent since government
surveillance of the school premises to insure neutrality was unneces-
sary. Furthermore, the Court found no basis to distinguish physi-
cian, nursing, dental, and optometric services, which the appellants
did not challenge, from diagnostic speech, hearing, and psychologi-
cal services, which were challenged. The Court relied on Lemon v.
Kurtzman,'9 where the provision of health services to nonpublic
must be available to assure that internally prepared tests are free of religious instruction.
There is a substantial risk that teacher-prepared tests may unconsciously or otherwise incul-
cate students with religious precepts. See 413 U.S. at 480. The potential for conflict "inheres
in the situation," and the state is constitutionally compelled to make sure that state funds
are not used for religious indoctrination. Failure to do so will result in the statute being held
unconstitutional. State aid only for standardized testing avoids the problem presented by the
aid for internally prepared tests. The nonpublic school does not control the content of the
standardized test or its result. This prevents its use as a tool of religious teaching, and thus
avoids direct aid to religion. See Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2601.
15. 97 S. Ct. at 2601.
16. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976) authorizes the expenditure of funds
"(D) [t]o provide speech and hearing diagnostic services to pupils attending nonpublic
schools within the district. Such service shall be provided in the nonpublic school attended
by the pupil receiving the service," and "(F) [t]o provide diagnostic psychological services
to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the district. Such services shall be provided in
the school attended by the pupil receiving the service."
17. The appellants argued that such services were constitutionally impermissible because
the speech and hearing staff might occasionally engage in unrestricted conversation with the
pupil and might fail to separate religious instruction from their secular work. Further, the
conversations between the psychological diagnostician and the pupil provide an opportunity
for the intrusion of religious influence. 97 S. Ct. at 2602.
18. The Court found that diagnostic services, unlike teaching and counseling, have little
or no educational content and are not closely associated with the educational mission of the
nonpublic school. Further, the limited contact the diagnostician has with the pupil does not
provide the same opportunity for transmission of sectarian views as does the teacher and
student or counselor and student relationship. Id. at 2603.
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon involved two appeals raising questions as to the validity
of Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing aid to church-related elementary and
secondary schools. The Pennsylvania program provided financial support to private schools
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schoolchildren was found not to have the primary effect of aiding
religion, and distinguished Meek, in which diagnostic speech and
hearing services were invalidated on entanglement grounds because
the compatible section was found to be unseverable from the uncon-
stitutional portions of the statute. 0
Section 3317.06(G), (H), (I), and (K)2' authorized expenditures
for certain therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services for students
who had been identified as having a need for specialized attention.2
The Court found that such services, offered on sites that are not
physically or educationally identified with the nonpublic school, did
not impermissibly foster religion. Since the services would be per-
formed by public employees, no excessive entanglement was cre-
ated. In distinguishing Meek, where the possibility was recognized
that public employees might advance religious beliefs while carry-
ing out their supposed religiously neutral responsibilities, the
Wolman Court asserted that the danger in Meek existed not because
the public employee was likely to deliberately "subvert his task to
the service of religion," but rather because the compulsion to the
by reimbursing them for the cost of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials
for specified secular subjects. The Rhode Island statute permitted the state to pay directly
to teachers in nonpublic schools a supplement of 15% of their annual salary. Both statutes
were held to be unconstitutional.
20. 97 S. Ct. at 2602-03.
21. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976) authorizes expenditure of funds
(G) [tlo provide therapeutic psychological and speech and hearing services to pup-
ils attending nonpublic schools within the district ....
(H) [t]o provide guidance and counseling services to pupils attending nonpublic
schools within the district ....
(I) [tlo provide remedial services to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the
district . ...
(K) [t]o provide programs for the deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, crippled, and
physically handicapped children attending nonpublic schools within the district. ...
In addition, each subsection states:
Such services shall be provided in the public school, in public centers, or in mobile
units located off of the nonpublic premises as determined by the state department of
education. If such services are provided in the public school or in public centers,
transportation to and from such facilities shall be provided by the public school district
in which the nonpublic school is located.
22. The appellants conceded that such services provided both to public and nonpublic
school students simultaneously in public schools or centers or in mobile units are constitu-
tional. They argued, however, that anywhere a facility might be used to service only non-
public school students raised the danger that the public employee might act in a manner
reinforcing the ideological views of the sectarian school; the assistance therefore would
amount to direct aid to the sectarian institution. Brief for Appellants at 41-42, 46, Wolman
v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
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religious environment might modify his behavior.3 Furthermore,
the concern that a mobile unit on a neutral site might on occasion
serve only sectarian pupils was of no consequence to the Court be-
cause it perceived the danger in Meek arising from the nature of the
institution where services were performed and not from the nature
of the pupils.'
Section 3317.06(B) and (C)" authorized funds to purchase and
loan to individual pupils or their parents upon their request such
instructional materials and equipment as were used in the public
schools within the district and which were "incapable of diversion
to religious use."2 The Court determined that although the loan was
ostensibly limited to religiously neutral materials, it inescapably
had the primary effect of furnishing direct aid to religion because
of the impossibility of separating the secular function from the sec-
tarian.Y For support, the Court relied on Committee for Public Edu-
cation & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 21 where a tuition reimburse-
ment program in which New York gave low income parents who sent
their children to nonpublic schools a direct cash grant of $50 to $100
23. 97 S. Ct. at 2605. The danger arose in Meek because the services were to be performed
in the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-related school. "So long as these types
of services are offered at truly religiously neutral locations, the danger perceived in Meek does
not arise." Id.
24. Id.
25. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976) authorizes expenditure of funds
(B) [t]o purchase and to loan to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the
district or to their parents upon individual request, such secular, neutral and nonideo-
logical instructional materials as are in use in the public schools within the district
and which are incapable of diversion to religious use and to hire clerical personnel to
administer such lending program.
(C) [t]o purchase and to loan to pupils attending nonpublic schools within the
district or to their parents, upon individual request, such secular, neutral and nonideo-
logical instructional equipment as is in use in the public school within the district and
which is incapable of diversion to religious use and to hire clerical personnel to admin-
ister such lending program.
26. The equipment included projectors, tape recorders, record players, maps, globes, sci-
ence kits, weather forecasting charts, and the like. 97 S. Ct. at 2606. The district court found
these sections, as limited, to be constitutional because it could not distinguish the loan of
instructional materials and equipment from the loan of textbooks upheld in Meek and in
Allen. Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. at 1119.
27. 97 S. Ct. at 2606. In Meek, the Court had determined that the direct loan to nonpublic
schools of instructional materials and equipment was impermissible despite the secular na-
ture of the items. To avoid the consequences of Meek, the Ohio legislature provided for loans
only to the pupil or his parent. The Wolman Court rejected this factor as exalting form over
substance and stated that the programs are really the same. Id. at 2606-07.
28. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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per child was held unconstitutional as direct aid to religion. The
Wolman Court reasoned that if a grant in cash to parents is imper-
missible, then a grant in kind is no better.2'
Finally, the Court examined expenditures for field trip transpor-
tation authorized in section 3317.06(L).3" This service was held to
be impermissible direct aid to sectarian education because the non-
public schools controlled the timing and frequency of the field trips
and as such were the true recipients of the service rather than the
children.3 Furthermore, the close supervision of nonpublic school
teachers that would be necessary to ensure that the funds were used
only for secular purposes would result in excessive government en-
tanglement.2
The establishment clause of the first amendment against which
the Wolman Court evaluated Ohio's statute states that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof . . . ."33 According to Jefferson, the
clause was intended to erect "a wall of separation between Church
and State. 3 In Everson v. Board of Education,3s the first Supreme
29. 97 S. Ct. at 2607. The state in Nyquist attempted to justify the tuition reimbursement
program, as Ohio did the loan of instructional materials and equipment here, on the basis
that the aid flowed to the parents rather than to the sectarian schools. The Nyquist Court
observed, however, that there was no attempt to guarantee separation of secular and religious
education functions and to provide state aid only for the former. 413 U.S. at 783.
30. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(L) (Page Supp. 1976) authorizes expenditure of funds
"[tlo provide such field trip transportation and services to nonpublic school students as are
provided to public school students in the district. School districts may contract with commer-
cial transportation companies for such transportation service if school district busses are
unavailable."
31. 97 S. Ct. at 2608. The Wolman Court contrasted the bus fare program upheld in
Everson, providing transportation only to and from school, with the Ohio plan and noted that
the plan in Everson was acceptable because the school did not determine how often the pupil
traveled between home and school and because the travel was unrelated to any aspect of the
curriculum. Id. The fact that the schools, rather than the children, are truly the recipients of
the service may be sufficient basis alone to invalidate the program as impermissible direct
aid, said the Court, citing Lemon. Id. Furthermore, the Court recognized it is the individual
teacher who makes a field trip meaningful and an integral part of the educational experience.
Because the teacher works in a sectarian institution, an unacceptable risk of fostering religion
existed. Id.
32. Id. at 2609. "Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine
the extent and intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the limitations
imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between church and state." Id. (quoting Lemon).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. 8 JEFFERSON WORKS 113, quoted in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
35. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court in Everson upheld a New Jersey statute which authorized
the spending of tax revenues to pay the bus fares of parochial school students as part of a
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Court case dealing directly with the establishment clause, the Court
broadly interpreted the clause to mean at least that government
cannot pass laws which "aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer
one religion over another." The Everson Court further stated that
no tax in any amount could be levied to support any religious insti-
tutions, and that the government could not "openly or secretly par-
ticipate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups.' '3
Yet, despite the sweeping prohibitions of the clause and the Court's
pronouncements in Everson, total separation between church and
state has been recognized as both impossible and undesirable .3  It
has been acknowledged that not all legislative programs that pro-
vide indirect benefit to religious activities are prohibited by the
Constitution .3 "The problem, like many problems in constitutional
law, is one of degree."4 Since the Court seems to have decided that
a certain amount of government involvement with religion is per-
missible and indeed inevitable, the theoretically absolute standard
of the establishment clause offers little guidance in ascertaining
what kind of involvement would tip the balance toward government
sponsorship of or interference with religion. 1 The job for the Court
has been to balance the rhetoric with a workable system of govern-
ment neutrality regarding religious activity that nonetheless
general program under which the state paid the fares of pupils attending public and other
schools.
36. Id. at 15.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760.
39. Id. at 775. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)
(property tax exemptions for church property were held not violative of the establishment
clause despite the fact that such exemptions relieved the church of a financial burden);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws sustained even though one
of their undeniable effects was to render it somewhat more likely that citizens would respect
religious institutions and even attend religious services).
40. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). Zorach and another brought a proceeding
for review of the action of the Board of Education of the City of New York in establishing a
"released time" program for the religious instruction of public schoolchildren. The program
involved neither religious instruction in public schools nor the use of public funds. Id. at 308-
09. The United States Supreme Court held the statute to be constitutional. The Court said
government may not finance religious groups, undertake religious instruction, blend secular
and sectarian education, or use secular institutions to force one or more religions on any
person. "But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government
to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of
religious influence." Id. at 314. See 86 HAev. L. REv. 1068, 1073-76 (1973).
41. 397 U.S. at 668-70. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 358-59; Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. at 612.
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"respects the religious nature of our people.""2
The Supreme Court Justices often have divergent opinions on
whether a particular form of aid tips the scales toward unconstitu-
tionality, and the plurality decision in Wolman presents a good
example of the variety of opinion on the Bench. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist would hold the entire statute
constitutional.' 3 Justice Brennan would invalidate the entire statute
because of the divisive political potential inherent in so large a
subsidy to carry out the programs." Justice Stevens declared that
all forms of state aid to sectarian schools are invalid, but he sug-
gested that public health services may be constitutionally adminis-
tered.'" Justice Powell would uphold the entire statute except for the
provision of instructional materials and equipment. However, he
suggested a method by which even those services could be pro-
vided.46 Finally, Justice Marshall recommended that Allen be over-
ruled and that a new test for distinguishing acceptable from unac-
ceptable forms of aid be formulated. 7
42. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 314.
43. 97 S. Ct. at 2609. The Chief Justice offered no analysis for his decision. Justices White
and Rehnquist cited as their basis the reasons stated in Justice Rehnquist's separate opinion
in Meek and Justice White's dissenting opinion in Nyquist.
44. Id. at 2609-10. Justice Brennan believed that the amount of the subsidy must be
evaluated in determining the compatibility of the statute with the establishment clause. He
concluded that a "divisive political potential of unusual magnitude" existed in the Ohio
program. In his opinion, this factor alone would justify invalidating the entire Ohio statute
as offending the first amendment's prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of
religion." Divisive political potential was recognized by the Lemon Court as a fourth test,
but ignored by the Wolman Court. See note 48 infra.
45. 97 S. Ct. at 2614-15. Justice Stevens stated that any state subsidy of sectarian schools
is invalid because financing of buildings, field trips, instructional materials, educational
tests, and school books "all give aid to the school's educational mission, which at heart is
religious." However, he believed that the state can provide public health services to children
attending nonpublic schools and so would not hold this part of the statute invalid on its face.
46. Id. at 2613-14. Justice Powell saw any risk of significant religious control over our
democratic processes or of deep political division along religious lines to be remote and toler-
able when viewed against the positive contributions of sectarian schools, especially in light
of continuous overseeing by the Supreme Court. He, therefore, would uphold the entire Ohio
statute except for the provision of instructional materials and equipment. His analysis of
Meek and Allen suggested to him that some loans of materials helpful to the educational
function were permissible so long as the aid was incapable of diversion to religious uses and
so long as the materials were lent to the individual student rather than the sectarian institu-
tions. The Ohio statute did not separate those instructional materials which may be meaning-
fully lent to individuals from those which may not and so he agreed with the majority in
striking down this part of § 3317.06. However, he saw no constitutional problem in a statute
lending certain instructional materials to the individuals themselves.
47. Id. at 2610-12. Justice Marshall would resolve the tension between Allen and Meek
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The judgment of the Court as announced by Justice Blackmun
evaluated the assistance authorized in the Ohio statute under the
three-part test first set forth in Lemon."5 The first test requires that
the statute have a legitimate purpose-providing for the education
and welfare of all school children." This inquiry has become a mere
formality, however, with the Court generally accepting the state's
asserted purpose at face value 0
The second test requires that the statute's primary or necessary
effect neither advance nor inhibit religion; the Court will consider
whether the necessary effect is contrary to the statute's stated pur-
pose.51 The test seems to necessitate showing (a) that the program
by overruling Allen. The textbook loan program was upheld in Meek on the assumption that
a sectarian school's function of religious instruction is separable from its secular education
function, an assumption flatly rejected in Meek regarding teaching materials and equipment.
The rationale of Allen was undamaged, therefore, only if there was a constitutionally signifi-
cant difference between a loan of materials directly to a sectarian school and a loan to the
students for use in sectarian schools. No such distinction exists, as the Court demonstrated
in Wolman. Further, the dangers of political divisiveness along religious lines required that
Allen be overruled. Justice Marshall next suggested a method to differentiate between accept-
able and unacceptable forms of aid which he believed was capable of consistent application.
"That line, I believe, should be placed between general welfare programs that serve children
in sectarian schools because the schools happen to be a convenient place to reach the pro-
grams' target populations and programs of educational assistance." Id. at 2611. Under this
test, Justice Marshall would hold state aid for speech, hearing, and psychological diagnostic
services, and therapeutic services (subsections (D), (F), (G)) constitutionally permissible as
services which promote children's health and well-being with only an indirect and remote
impact on their educational progress. However, state aid to provide textbooks, instructional
materials and equipment, standardized testing and scoring, guidance and remedial services,
and field trip transportation (subsections (A), (B), (C), (H), (I), (J), and (K)) would be
unconstitutional as directly supporting the educational programs of sectarian schools.
48. 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon Court also recognized a fourth and separatetest: the
potential for divisive political debate and division along religious lines because of the neces-
-sity that state assistance involve considerable political activity. The potential divisiveness
was viewed as a threat to the normal political process. Id. at 622-23. Two years later, in Ny-
quist, the Court noted the importance of this fourth factor in the weighing process. 413 U.S.
at 795-96. However, the Court in Meek and Wolman did not view this factor as being of
crucial importance. In Meek, the fourth factor was cited for support, but was not determina-
tive. 421 U.S. at 372. In Wolman, this factor was mentioned only in the dissents of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. 97 S. Ct. at 2609-14.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. See note 8 and accompanying text supra. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773.
51. By pursuing the inquiry into any underlying sectarian motivation through the effect
test rather than the purpose test, the Court avoids a "frontal attack on the legislators'
veracity." Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to
Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1175, 1181 (1974). Once the state's justification for the statute
has been accepted, the Court will be more willing to probe the underlying legislative intent
as part of the effect test. Id.
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of aid as planned assists only the secular function of the nonpublic
school which has been found to be severable from the sectarian," (b)
that the aid in fact reaches only the secular function, and (c) that
safeguards necessary to prevent possible abuse are present. A pro-
gram of aid designed to assist only the secular function of the non-
public school will provide appropriate restrictions on expenditures
in the statute 3
Because sectarian schools attempt to provide an integrated secu-
lar and religious education, the statute also should channel the aid
to the secular function of the nonpublic school in a manner that
avoids providing "direct" assistance to the sectarian function;
"indirect" assistance to the sectarian function will not be sufficient
to invalidate the statute. 4 To separate the narrow channel between
direct and indirect aid and to ensure that the aid reaches only the
secular function of the nonpublic schools, the aid should be unre-
lated to any aspect of the curriculum.55 In addition, the primary
effect test requires sufficient safeguards to ensure against sectarian
abuse of the assistance." It is often said that the state must be
"certain" that its aid does not advance the religious purpose of the
nonpublic school. 7 However, what is necessary to demonstrate this
certainty is often elusive. The mere possibility that a teacher or
diagnostician working in the nonpublic school at a secular function
may consciously attempt to subvert legitimate legislative objectives
52. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 245, 248 (religious schools pursue two goals,
religious instruction and secular education, which are not so intertwined that secular text-
books are instrumental in teaching religion). But see Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2607
("In view of the impossibility of separating the secular education function from the sectarian,
the state aid [in supplying instructional materials] inevitably flows in part in support of the
religious role of the schools.").
53. See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
54. Id. at 775-76.
55. The fact that the bus fare program in Everson was unrelated to any aspect of the
curriculum was seen by the Wolman Court as an important distinction from the field trip
services proposed in the Ohio statute. Field trips, an integral part of the educational experi-
ence, presented to the Court an unacceptable risk of fostering religion. 97 S. Ct. at 2608.
Although a similar argument could be raised regarding the loan of textbooks, upheld in
Wolman, the Court refused to break with precedent and relied on Allen in permitting such
state aid. 97 S. Ct. at 2607 n.18.
56. Sectarian abuse occurs whenever a teacher, counselor, or administrator, in utilizing
the state aid, unconsciously or consciously, inculcates students with the religious views of the
sponsoring church. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 618.
57. Id. at 619. In its attempt to be certain that state aid serves only secular functions, a
state may not provide for continuing state surveillance, for this would result in excessive
entanglement between church and state. Id.
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by inserting religious views into his secular function will not serve
to invalidate a statute;58 however, something more than a mere as-
sumption that nonpublic school workers will succeed in separating
their secular from their sectarian function is required to be shown.5 9
Providing diagnostic and therapeutic services-basically health
services-to all schoolchildren, public and nonpublic, was not
viewed by the Court as having the primary effect of aiding religion.60
The approved services were described as falling within the class of
general welfare services for children that may be provided by the
state regardless of any incidental benefit that may result for the
nonpublic school." Furthermore, the Wolman Court recognized that
it must also guard against possible discrimination against religion
and therefore refused to deny special assistance to schoolchildren
with handicaps that prevent them from benefitting fully from edu-
cation merely because they attend a church-sponsored school.2
The final test requires that the statute avoid government entan-
glement with religion. Because absence of all contacts between
church and state is impossible, 3 the restriction on government en-
tanglement with religion forbids only excessive contacts. 4 If the
effect of the statute might be, although is not necessarily, to aid the
sectarian function, government surveillance or supervision would be
required to ensure that funds are used only for secular purposes, and
the state's entanglement with religion would be deemed excessive. 5
The Court, therefore, seeks to avoid not only government support
of religion, but also government intrusion into religion which by
58. "A possibility always exists, of course, that the legitimate objectives of any law or
legislative program may be subverted by conscious design or lax enforcement . . . . But
judicial concern about these possibilities cannot, standing alone, warrant striking down a
statute as unconstitutional." Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971). Tilton was the
first Supreme Court decision approving direct cash grants to church related colleges and
universities.
59. The state may not "provide state aid on the basis of a mere assumption that secular
teachers under religious discipline can avoid conflicts." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 619.
This puts the burden on the state to affirmatively demonstrate that it has devised sufficient
safeguards to ensure against state aid being used to further sectarian purposes.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2602.
61. Id. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
62. See 97 S. Ct. at 2605 n.14.
63. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
64. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. at 674, 676.
65. See note 59 supra. See also Zoetewey, Excessive Entanglement: Development of a




itself conflicts with the establishment clause."6
A basic inconsistency, described by the Court as a "tension,"
exists in the Wolman Court's approval of purchases of secular text-
books for loan to nonpublic schoolchildren, and disapproval of pur-
chases of secular instructional materials and equipment. Like text-
books, instructional materials and equipment are secular and non-
ideological in nature and were to be lent directly to the students and
their parents. Therefore, like the textbooks in Allen, such materials
should be self-policing, having a fixed content not divertible to reli-
gious use. Nevertheless, the Wolman Court invalidated such aid. In
permitting the loan of textbooks, the Court followed the concept
expounded in Allen and followed in Meek, that limiting textbooks
to those used in public schools is sufficient to ensure that the books
will not be put to religious purposes. 7 The result in Allen was ex-
plained by the Court in Nyquist as merely the recognition that
sectarian schools perform secular as well as religious education func-
tions and that some forms of assistance may be given to the secular
without providing direct aid to the sectarian. 8 However, the pre-
sumption that items, themselves religiously neutral, will not be put
to sectarian use has not been accepted regarding other forms of state
aid; specifically, maintenance and repair of school facilities and
equipment programs,6 9 field trip transportation, and instructional
materials and equipment. 0 Furthermore, the requirement that the
state be certain that aid not advance religious purposes is ignored
by the presumption. The statement which the Meek Court used to
invalidate a direct loan to nonpublic schools of instructional materi-
als and equipment, and which the Wolman Court used for support
of its decision to invalidate the loan of such materials to nonpublic
schoolchildren, applies with equal force to textbooks: "Substantial
aid to the educational function of such schools . . . necessarily re-
sults in aid to the sectarian school enterprise as a whole."'
66. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 620; Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
at 18.
67. "Board of Education v. Allen has remained law, and we now follow as a matter of stare
decisis the principle that restriction of textbooks to those provided the public schools is
sufficient to ensure that the books will not be used for religious purposes." 97 S. Ct. at 2607
n.18.
68. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 775.
69. Id. at 774-77.
70. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2605-09.
71. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 366.
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In refusing to overrule Allen and Meek, the Wolman Court perpet-
uates a basic inconsistency in establishment clause analysis. The
presumption that the content of textbooks is something that can be
ascertained in advance and cannot be diverted to sectarian uses has
been rejected by Court decisions subsequent to Allen and is contrary
to the analysis that instructional materials and equipment can be
so diverted.72 It may be argued that the loan of textbooks merely
approaches the verge of a state's power under the Constitution but
does not, in fact, cross the line to become impermissible aid. But,
as Chief Justice Burger warned in Lemon, there is a tendency in
constitutional adjudication for steps which were said to approach
the verge when taken to become later the platform for still further
steps.73 As long as Allen remains good law, a platform exists from
which to move ever closer to state support of religion. The Court
must either overrule Allen and Meek or venture into new forms of
state aid to nonpublic schools, especially as the costs of sectarian
education grow and the pressures to expand state aid increase.7" A
third alternative would be for establishment clause analysis to
continue in its present course but with A len remaining outside the
mainstream of judicial analysis. This alternative, however, will
leave the states in doubt as to what forms of aid will be judicially
sanctioned because no consistent rules and precedent may be exam-
ined.
Review of the Wolman decision suggests to the states that general
welfare programs which aid sectarian students are acceptable. Such
programs have little or no educational content and are not closely
associated with the educational mission of the nonpublic school."
All services which genuinely promote the welfare of children argua-
bly assist the religious function of sectarian schools indirectly, but
it is to such a small extent that on balance the benefit to the school-
children and society at large has been deemed to outweigh any
constitutional problem. Beginning in Everson, the Court recognized
that the first amendment requires only that a state be neutral in its
relations with religious institutions; it does not require the state to
be its adversary."e In Meek, the Court noted that not all legislative
72. See notes 67 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
73. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 624.
74. 97 S. Ct. at 2611 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting).
75. 97 S. Ct. at 2603.
76. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. at 18 ("State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religions than it is to favor them.").
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programs that indirectly or incidentally benefit religious institu-
tions are prohibited by the Constitution.77 In reaching its decision
that general welfare aid to children does not directly support reli-
gious institutions and is, therefore, constitutionally permissible, the
Court remains within its enunciated standards and consistent with
its prior analysis. However, because "there is nothing ideological"
about a school nurse or speech and hearing diagnostician, the con-
stitutionality of these forms of aid involves considerations not pres-
ent in the case of textbooks. 8 Textbooks may be the chief mode of
perpetuating a particular religious faith because they can contain
many seeds of dogma.7 Furthermore, the difficulty with a textbook
loan program is that there is no reliable method to distinguish secu-
lar from religious textbooks.8 Nevertheless, the United States Su-
preme Court has sanctioned such aid to nonpublic schools. If such
aid is permissible, state legislators must wonder what form of aid is
not permitted. The Supreme Court has attempted to draw a distinc-
tion between the loan of textbooks and the loan of instructional
materials, but its reasoning is not easily apprehended. Instead of
permitting such doubt to continue, the Court should take a decisive
step to overrule Allen. In that way, states will be given rational and
consistent guidelines which they can follow in formulating legisla-
tion. Analysis of current precedent leaves the states without firm
principles upon which to rely and in fact encourages them to search
for "new ways of achieving forbidden ends."'" It remains for yet
another law attempting to follow the Court's standards to come up
for review to see if such a bold move will win the majority's ap-
proval.
Annaliesse Masser
77. 421 U.S. at 359.
78. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79. "The textbook goes to the very heart of education in a parochial school." Id.
80. Id. at 257-58.
81. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2615 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

